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IDENTIFYING REPLACEMENT PROPERTY
IN A LIKE-KIND EXCHANGE
— by Neil E. Harl*
Like-kind exchanges have been important in agriculture
for decades.1 While like-kind machinery exchanges are
clearly the most common type of tax-free exchange,2 like-
kind exchanges of interests in real property have been on
the increase in recent years.
A major concern is when the replacement property must
be identified and when the replacement property must be
received.3 A 1996 Tax Court case has examined those
requirements.4
Statutory requirements
In 1984, Congress amended the tax-free exchange rules5
to address the issue of how quickly the replacement
property must be identified and received.6  Congressional
concern had arisen because of a Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision, Starker v. United States,7 which approved
an exchange where the replacement property was not
received for several years.
The 1984 amendments specified that like-kind exchange
property had to be identified and the exchange completed
not more than 180 days after transfer of the exchanged
property.8  Moreover, property is not treated as like-kind
property if (1) it is not identified as exchange property on or
before 45 days after the day the property relinquished is
given up9 or (2) the property is received after the earlier of
180 days after the property relinquished is given up or the
due date (with extensions) for the transferor’s federal
income tax return for the year the transfer of the
relinquished property occurs.10
The statute is silent on the number of replacement
properties that may be identified.
Regulations
In 1991, the Internal Revenue Service issued regulations
providing, in general, that a taxpayer is in compliance with
the identification requirement in the statute if the taxpayer
identifies either — (1) a maximum of three properties as
replacement properties or (2) any number of properties,
provided the fair market value11 of the designated properties
does not exceed 200 percent of the fair market value of all
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properties relinquished by the taxpayer in the exchange.12
The regulations applied prospectively only, to transfers on
or after June 10, 1991.13
Tax Court decision
In the 1996 decision, the Tax Court was faced with a
fact situation arising before the effective date of the
regulations but after the enactment of the statute.14 In that
case, St. Laurent v. Commissioner,15 the taxpayer had
identified 20 replacement properties.16 IRS contended that
the number of replacement properties identified exceeded
the number contemplated by the statute.17
The Commissioner relied upon a passage in the
conference committee report —
“The conferees note that the designation requirement in
the conference agreement may be met by designating
the property to be received in the contract between the
parties. It is anticipated that the designation requirement
will be satisfied if the contract between the parties
specifies a limited number of properties that may be
transferred and the particular property to be transferred
will be determined by contingencies beyond the control
of both parties.”18
The taxpayer argued that the statute did not expressly limit
to less than 20 the number of replacement properties that
could be designated.19
The Tax Court agreed with the taxpayer.20  The court
indicated its belief that Congress intended that taxpayers
identify a finite number of replacement properties and noted
that any other interpretation would render the identification
requirement meaningless.2 1  The court found the
identification of 20 replacement properties in St. Laurent 22
was made in good faith and did “not cause an absurd result,
given the fact that the statute is silent as to the permissible
number and the legislative history is an unreliable indicator
of the property limitation.”23  The court pointed out that the
regulation limiting the number of identified replacement
properties was issued some time after the identification was
made by the taxpayer in the St. Laurent case.24
Implications for the regulations
Obviously concerned that the decision in St. Laurent 25
could be interpreted as calling into question the validity of
the regulation in providing a specific limit on the number of
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replacement properties that could be identified, the Tax
Court in a footnote stated clearly that the decision should
not be interpreted as inferring that the regulation “is not a
valid exercise of the Commissioner’s authority to interpret a
statute which is silent on the matter.”26
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 4 Harl Agricultural Law § 27.03[8][a]
(1996); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 4.02[16]
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3 I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3).
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9 I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3)(A).
10 I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3)(B).
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26 St. Laurent v. Comm’r, n. 14 supra.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
HORSES. The plaintiff was injured when the plaintiff’s
automobile struck two of the defendant’s horses on a public
highway. The plaintiff sued in absolute liability under
Baltimore County Ordinance 6-204 which made animal
owners liable for damages caused by the animals. The
ordinance did not restate state law which provided only for
liability by negligence or strict liability. The defendant
argued that the ordinance could not create a new cause of
action involving an area of statewide concern. The court
agreed, holding that the absolute liability of the ordinance
was a new cause of action because it imposed liability
without a showing of negligence or that the defendant knew
that the horses had a propensity to escape, which was
required for imposition of strict liability. Gunpowder
Stables v. State Farm, 673 A.2d 721 (Md. Ct. App. 1996).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AUTOMATIC STAY. Prior to filing for bankruptcy,
the Chapter 11 farmer debtor signed an agreement with a
secured creditor not to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition
and not to oppose any motion for relief from the automatic
stay filed by the creditor if the debtor did file for
bankruptcy. The court held the contractual waiver of the
automatic stay unenforceable because (1) the debtor lacked
the capacity to waive the rights of the debtor in possession,
(2) the waiver was unenforceable under several provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code, and (3) the Bankruptcy Code
invalidates contractual provisions which waive the debtor’s
bankruptcy rights. Matter of Pease, 195 B.R. 431 (Bankr.
D. Neb. 1996).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
PLAN MODIFICATION. The debtors had completed
their Chapter 12 plan payments and received their
discharge. The plan had provided for payment of a secured
claim over 30 years. The claim was secured by a lien
against farm real and personal property. Three years after
the discharge, the debtors sought to modify the plan by
selling the collateral real estate, paying a portion of the
proceeds on the secured claim and providing a substitute
lien on other real estate. The rest of the proceeds would be
used to pay off other debts and for operating expenses. The
court held that the plan could not be modified because the
original five years of the plan had passed and because the
debtors had no change in circumstances which supported a
needed modification of the plan. The court noted that the
debtors could satisfy the debt from the proceeds of the sale
of the land and use the other real estate as collateral for
other loans for operating expenses. Matter of
Schnakenberg, 195 B.R. 435 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996).
TRUSTEE FEES. The Chapter 12 debtor’s plan
provided for most of the plan payments to be made directly
to creditors and the plan was confirmed over the objection
of the trustee. The trustee’s appeals of the ruling were
fruitless and the trustee sought, under the equitable powers
of the court, compensation for the substantial expenses
incurred in administering the case. The trustee argued that
the court had the authority, under Section 105, to provide
for adequate compensation of the trustee where the plan did
not provide for payments through the trustee’s office. The
court held that Section 105 could be used only to enforce or
